2002 – Berlin

• ab 19.30: Gemeinsames Treffen im Ristorante "La Fattoria"

• 8.30 - 8.45: Begrüßung durch den Ausschussvorsitzenden Prof. Rolf Bühner und den Gastgeber Prof. Klaus Zimmermann

• 8.45 - 10.00: Günter Knieps, "Wettbewerb auf den europäischen Transportmärkten: Das Problem der Netzzugänge"

Abstract:
Funktionsfähiger Wettbewerb auf den europäischen Transportmärkten erfordert den diskriminierungsfreien Zugang zu den Verkehrsinfrastrukturen für sämtliche aktiven und potenziellen Anbieter von Transportleistungen. Neben der Bedingung der Diskriminierungsfreiheit gilt es aber gleichzeitig eine effiziente Allokation knapper Infrastrukturkapazitäten sowie die erforderliche Kostendeckung anzustreben. In diesem Beitrag wird ein disaggregierter Regulierungsansatz vorgestellt, dessen Umsetzung es ermöglicht, diese Ziele möglichst umfassend zu erreichen.
 
Korreferenten: Peter Zweifel, Michael Fritsch

• 10.00 - 10.30: Kaffeepause

• 10.30 - 11.45: Klaus Schöler, "Alternative Organisation zweistufiger Strommärkte"

Korreferenten: Anette Boom, Hans-Joachim Hofmann

• 11.45 - 13.00: Karl Morasch, "Elektronische Koordination in Oligopolmärkten: Auswirkung auf Transportkosten und Produktdifferenzierung"

Abstract:
Durch elektronische Koordination wachsen räumlich getrennte Märkte zusammen, die bislang nur unvollständig ökonomisch integriert waren. Der daraus resultierende verstärkte Wettbewerbsdruck sollte die Anreize der Unternehmen zur Produktdifferenzierung eigentlich erhöhen. Die Interaktion der Investitionsentscheidungen in transportkostensenkende elektronische Koordination und in verstärkte Produktdifferenzierung wird in einem Duopol mit räumlich getrennten Märkten analysiert. Während immer ein zumindest schwach positiver Anreiz zur Investition in Transportkostensenkung besteht, existieren Parameterbereiche in denen nach einer exogenen Senkung der Transportkosten die Unternehmen die Produktdifferenzierung verringern. Im Absatzmarkt wird sowohl Preiswettbewerb (plausibel bei digitalen Gütern) als auch Mengenwettbewerb (realistisch als Kapazitätsentscheidung bei physischen Produkten) berücksichtigt und für diese beiden Typen von Gütern werden jeweils soziale und private Investitionsanreize miteinander verglichen.

Korreferenten: Siegfried Berninghaus, Hans Jürgen Ramser

• 13.00 - 14.15: Mittagspause

• 14.15 - 15.30: Armin Schmutzler, "Infrastructure Quality in Deregulated Industries: Is there an Underinvestment Problem?"

Korreferent: Georg Götz

• 15.30 - 16.00: Kaffeepause

• 16.00 - 17.15:Konrad Stahl, "Global vs. local competition: the case of e-commerce"

Abstract:
We analyze the impact of increased outside options brought to consumers by e-commerce on the classical retail market. If consumers have to choose once where to shop we show that under all forms of organizing the classical retail market, increased competition from ecommerce will crowd out variety in the retail market. However, the effect of increased competition on prices is much less clear. While it yields a price reduction under monopoly, prices increase under oligopoly. If consumers can shop in e-commerce after having bene…ted from inspection in the retail market, the monopoly will increase varieties in response to a decrease in prices in e-commerce.

Korreferenten: Bernd Woeckener, Helmut Zink

• 17.15 - 18.30: Christian Wey, "Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly"

Abstract:
This paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders. and outsiders. Gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand and costs. We provide a complete analysis for arbitrary numbers of Þrms, complements and substitutes, and degrees of product differentiation. An increase in concentration is more likely under Cournot competition if products are complements and more likely under Bertrand competition if products are substitutes. Moreover, as products become closer substitutes, a takeover becomes more likely under Bertrand and less likely under Cournot competition.

Korreferenten: Ulrich Kamecke, Jürgen Weigand

• 18.30 - 19.15: Mitgliederversammlung

• ab ca. 20 Uhr: Gemütliches Beisammensein im Restaurant "Alcatraz"

• 8.30 - 9.45: Heidrun Hoppe, "Innovation in Intermediation"

Abstract:
This paper offers a new theoretical framework to study the organization of innovation investments. Our main finding is that intermediaries between creators and potential users of new technology can allow users to economize on a critical component of innovation investment decisions - the expertise to overcome the problem of sorting 'profitable' inventions from'unprofitable' ones. Using a model of university-industry technology transfer, we identify two conditions under which intermediation in innovation become viable: first, success-based compensation schemes must be feasible, and second, the size of the invention pool must be succinctly large. The analysis suggests that intermediation in innovation involves substantial economies of scale. The findings of our model are consistent with empirical evidence. They can also help frame government intervention with regard to adoption of new technology.

Korreferent: Alexander Karmann

• 9.45 - 11.00: Thomas Gehrig, "Introductory Offers in a Model of Strategic Competition"

Abstract:
We show how introductory offers emerge endogenously under conditions of competition in markets with switching costs. In a standard Hotelling model we find the combination of switching costs and introductory discounts to reduce industry profits relative to industries without switching costs, in which introductory offers do not emerge. Thus, our analysis offers a formalized argument for the policy conclusion that the strategic use of introductory offers should be promoted, not banned, in environments where firms are able to discriminate across different vintages of customers.

Korreferenten: Hans Gersbach, Gerhard Illing

• 11.00 - 11.30: Kaffeepause

• 11.30 - 12.45: Günter Lang, "The Impact of R&D Expenditures on Productivity Growth"

Abstract:
Motivated by the observed reversal in labor productivity growth since the beginnings of the nineties, this paper is analyzing the relationship between R&D expenditures and productivity. Time series data of the German manufacturing industry are used to estimate a variable cost function, with the stock of knowledge being modeled as a quasifix input. R&D is found to be a significant determinant of productivity. More interestingly, the estimates show that the extracted yield is non-constant over the observation period. Current rates of return on own R&D are measured to be significantly lower than during the sixties. The long-term elasticity of production costs with respect to R&D reduced from about –0.08 to just -0.01, the elasticity of labor demand from about –0.35 to -0.15. Since the growth rates of real R&D were also declining, even got negative during the last years, the contribution of R&D to productivity growth is currently near to the lowest level since 1960.

Korreferenten: Thusnelda Tivig, Dietmar Harhoff

• 12.45: Schlussbemerkung und Ende der Sitzung